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1  Introduction 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the 
Millennium Development Goals were confirmed. These goals call for: 
—  the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, 
—  universal primary education, 
—  gender equality and the empowerment of women, 
—  the reduction in child mortality, 
—  improvement in maternal health, 
—  combat of HIV / AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 
—  environmental sustainability, 
—  the development of a global partnership. 
Most Millennium Development Goals are related to water. Goals such as food security 
and environmental sustainability require that water resources are protected effectively, 
that overexploitation is prevented and that appropriate water infrastructure is constructed 
and managed well. To a large extent, this is a governance issue. Skills and information 
need to be available, an appropriate legislative framework needs to be in place, decision-
making processes should be fair, transparent and effective, and all stakeholders affected 
by or influencing water management should be involved. 
The transboundary character of most water resources poses special problems. Worldwide 
more than 45 % of the land surface is located within international river basins and many 
groundwater aquifers are shared by more than one country (Wolf 1999). Unilateral action 
by one country concerning these resources is often ineffective (e.g. fish ladders in an 
upstream country only), inefficient (e.g. hydropower development in a flat downstream 
country) or simply impossible (many developments on boundary stretches). Moreover, 
unilateral action can significantly harm the other countries and may result in serious 
international tension. 
Many people fear that the wars of the 21
st century will be over water (cf. Wollebæk 
Toset, Gleditsch and Hegr 2000; cf. Swain 2000; cf. Trottier 2003b). There are however 
hardly any historical example of water wars (Wolf 1998), but conflicts falling short of a 
war have occurred frequently. For many international basins and aquifers no international 
agreement exists. For many other basins and aquifers, however, agreements do exist and 
effective institutions have been established that deliver benefits to all stakeholders. 
Complicating the picture further is that not every agreement contributes to the 
Millennium Development Goals. Some agreements only serve the interests of the national 
elites that pretend to represent their countries, while many agreements are based on the 
traditional water resources development paradigm that sees large-scale state-funded 
infrastructure works as the only way forward. A new water culture is needed that 
   considers water demand as well as water supply management, non-structural as well as 
structural and local as well as centralised solutions. 
This paper will explore these issues. It first presents a general framework for describing 
and understanding the development of transboundary water management, based on 
Mostert (2005). Next, it reports about the experiences in Europe, focusing on the Rhine 
basin, with its long history of co-operation, the Danube basin, with its recent political 
changes, and the Iberian basins, with their water scarcity and ongoing discussions on a 
new water culture. In addition, the European Water Framework Directive (EC 2000/60) is 
discussed. The paper concludes with four recommendations. 
2  Transboundary water management 
Transboundary water resources management in Europe and elsewhere can be equated 
with the development and implementation of international “agreements” (treaties, 
gentlemen’s agreements, etc.). In the end, what drives this process is not “objective” 
benefits of co-operation (see on these for instance Sadoff and Grey 2002; Klaphake 
2005), but how the major stakeholders perceive these benefits. If in their eyes co-
operation is a better alternative than non-co-operation, transboundary water management 
will progress. If not, it will stall. 
Transboundary water management can be analysed as a cyclical process consisting of 
different stages (Figure 1). The first and often most difficult stage in transboundary water 
management is convening. It consists of bringing the major stakeholders around the table 
(Gray 1989). The stakeholders need to be convinced that: 
(1)  the present situation does not serve their interests optimally; 
(2)  negotiations could result in a fair agreement that could serve their interests better 
(Fisher and Ury 1981); 






























Figure 1: Stages in transboundary water management (Mostert 2005, p.6) 
 
The second stage is the negotiations themselves (Gray 1989). If this has not yet been 
done at the convening stage, the agenda for the negotiations has to be decided upon and 
   some ground rules need to be agreed upon, for instance on confidentiality of the 
negotiations and on possibilities to exit. Moreover, the relevant “facts” have to be 
established, such as the natural river discharge, present use and projected demand, and 
several options need to be developed and assessed. 
The third stage is the conclusion of an agreement. Experience shows that it may take 
between one and 100 years (the Alpine Rhine: Marty 2001) before this stage is reached. 
The most common and powerful factor contributing to the conclusion of agreements is 
the wish to develop or maintain good international relations (Mostert 2003; cf. 
LeMarquand 1977). Moreover, crises can act as important stimuli for co-operation (see 
below). Usually, agreements involve the establishment of some form of river basin 
organisation or coordination platform (Burchi and Spreij 2003). 
As a rule, agreements need to be ratified or approved by a higher authority: a minister, 
the cabinet or parliament. This might prove difficult if the negotiators have not interacted 
effectively with these higher authorities. Problems may also occur after ratification or 
approval, when the agreement has to be implemented or complied with. Implementation 
or compliance is usually the responsibility of lower level government and water users 
who have not been involved in international negotiations. 
This also points to the fact that transboundary water management is not a purely interstate 
affair. “States” are, in fact, abstractions. They are legal concepts and important symbols 
and provide a source of identity for many people, but in practice the main parties in 
transboundary water management are specific groups and individuals (Figure 2). These 
include groups and individuals that possess formal authority and other important 
resources for developing or implementing international agreements, such as money, 
political influence, information and expertise. They also include groups and individuals 
that may be affected by water management but are unable to exert any significant 
influence, such as the local population (cf. Trottier 2003a). 
 
 
































Figure 2: Relations in transboundary water management (Mostert 2005, p. 12) 
   Focusing exclusively on the interests and goals of the “states” means in practice focusing 
on the interests and goals of national governments. This may result in too little attention 
for the interests and needs of underprivileged stakeholders. For example, according to the 
policy of the government of Senegal, the international co-operation on the Senegal River 
is a success. Large dams have been built and irrigated agricultural land has increased. 
However, reportedly (Adams 2000) this proved to be at the expense of flood-recession 
farming, fisheries, the environment and the health of the local population. The dams on 
the Salween River in Myanmar provide another example. These could be seen as an 
example of effective international co-operation if one ignores the fact that Myanmar is 
using forced labour to construct them (Moe 2000; US Department of Labor 2000) 
Transboundary co-operation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective 
management of transboundary resources. In addition, the co-operation should be 
inclusive and involve all important stakeholders, at national and at international levels. 
Moreover, the perceptions of the stakeholders that are involved and the dominant “water 
culture” more generally are crucial, as these determine what transboundary water 
management actually will look like and whether it contributes to the attainment of the 
millennium development goals or not. 
3  The Rhine and the Danube 
Rhine 
The Rhine is the largest river in the north-west of Europe. Its basin includes major 
European industrial areas, such as the Ruhr-area in Germany and the Rijnmond area near 
Rotterdam. The river itself is used intensively for shipping, waste disposal (although 
point-source pollution has decreased significantly), drinking water production, industrial 
water supply and nature purposes. 
Co-operation on the Rhine river has a very long history. Major progress has been 
achieved after major wars, other man-made and natural disasters and EU intervention. 
Co-operation started in the field of navigation. In 1815, just after the Napoleonic wars, 
the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna established the principle of freedom of 
navigation on international waterways. Moreover, a Central Commission for Rhine 
Navigation was created. This Commission, which still exists, consists of representatives 
from the member states Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland and 
has regulatory powers, for instance in the field of shipping safety. Infringements against 
the Convention for Rhine Navigation and regulations under this convention and certain 
civil matters, such as payments and dues for pilotage, can be brought against national 
Rhine tribunals. Appeal against their decisions is possible to a higher national court or to 
the court of appeal established by the Commission itself. (Act of Mannheim) 
From 1900 onwards pollution with chlorides started to get attention. After the Second 
World War, growing awareness of this problem led to the establishment of the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) in 1950. Initially, it 
dealt with research only, but since 1963 its task is to propose measures for protecting the 
Rhine against pollution. Members of the ICPR are Switzerland, Germany, France, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands and, since 1976, the European Commission. 
Chemical pollution got a lot of attention from 1971 onwards, when many fish died. 
Eventually, the negotiations on the Rhine’s chemical pollution were linked with the 
   negotiations on the dangerous substances directive of the EU (76/464/EEC). The main 
reason was that Germany did not want to accept stricter environmental controls on its 
industry, which is located to a large extent along the Rhine, than on the industry in other 
EU member states outside of the Rhine basin (Jesserun d'Oliveira 1987). 
On 3 December 1976, the “Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical 
Pollution” was concluded. Meanwhile agreement had been reached on the dangerous 
substances directive, which also regulated chemical pollution, but at the EU level, thus 
addressing Germany’s concerns about its own industry. 
Also on 3 December 1976 the same day the “Convention on the Protection of the Rhine 
against Pollution by Chlorides” was concluded. This convention required France to 
reduce chlorides emissions by 60 kg/s before 1 January 1980, to be financed largely by 
the other basin states (Switzerland 6%, Germany 30% and The Netherlands 34%). The 
first stage would be a reduction by 20 kg/s. Further measures would depend on an 
agreement on the technique and financing (Dieperink 1997; 1999). The official argument 
for the financial contributions was that the French potassium mines were not the only 
source of chlorides pollution and that the French reductions would mean that the other 
basin countries did not have to reduce their emissions. But in practice, the French 
potassium mines are the single biggest source, and the financial contributions can be seen 
as a concession to France in order to get an agreement. 
Implementation of the conventions turned out to be difficult. Due to protests in the 
Alsace region, the region of the potassium mines, the French government refused to 
submit the Chlorides Convention to parliament for ratification. Emission standards for 
chemicals were formulated for only four “black list substances”. It turned out that many 
black list substances did not occur in the Rhine basin in significant quantities, could not 
be detected, or came primarily from diffuse sources. Moreover, sometimes EU standards 
were considered more appropriate. 
International co-operation got new impetus when, on 1 November 1986, a fire broke out 
at Sandoz AG near Basel. The water used for extinguishing the fire brought huge 
quantities of pesticides into the Rhine. Within two weeks, a Rhine Ministers Conference 
was organised, and in May 1987 a concept Rhine Action Plan was ready, which included 
as central goals the return of the Salmon in the Rhine and a 50% reduction of emissions 
for many substances (Dieperink 1997). According to the secretary of the ICPR at the 
time, co-operation was promoted quite a lot by the fact that immediately after the 
accident, the downstream countries did not blame Switzerland for the accident (which 
could have caused defensive behaviour on the part of Switzerland), but instead expressed 
their concern that of all countries the accident had to happen in Switzerland, with its good 
record in water management (P. Huisman, former secretary of the ICPR, personal 
communication). 
The Netherlands gave the highest priority to the implementation of the Rhine Action Plan 
(ICPR 1987). This had repercussions on the negotiations concerning the further reduction 
of chloride emissions from minus 20 kg/s to minus 60 kg/s. Since The Netherlands would 
have to contribute financially, this would be very expensive for The Netherlands too. A 
compromise was reached in 1991. The Dutch drinking water companies made clear that 
they would have to make very high costs if chloride concentrations at their intake points 
would not go down. Moreover, it was found out that the concentrations could be brought 
down by changing the water infrastructure in the Netherlands, at a much lower cost than 
   further reductions in France. In the end, it was agreed to implement the local measures in 
The Netherlands and reduce the financial contribution of the Netherlands to France. 
The present phase in the international Rhine co-operation started in 1994. Following the 
floods in late 1993, it was decided that the ICPR should be active in flood protection as 
well. Building on the good relations that had developed, despite occasional problems, in 
1998 the Action Plan Flood Protection could be published (ICPR 1998). Furthermore, a 
new Rhine Treaty was signed on 12 April 1999 (ICPR 1999). Finally, as the Rhine 
Action Plan ended in the year 2000, the new programme "Rhine 2020; Program for the 
Sustainable Development of the Rhine" has been adopted on 29 January 2001 
(Conference of Rhine Ministers 2001). 
The ICPR is basically an inter-governmental commission for discussing Rhine-related 
matters. The decisions of the ICPR have the form of an advice to its member states 
(decisions on monitoring and research programmes excepted). Moreover, the member 
states have to report to the ICPR on the measures that they have taken for protecting the 
Rhine. 
The ICPR consists of a Plenary Assembly and a president; three working groups, a co-
ordination group and a secretariat headed by a secretary. The Plenary Assembly consists 
of delegations from the five participating countries and the EU and meets at least once a 
year. Decisions are taken by unanimity (with maximally one abstention). The working 
groups and project groups consist of national experts from the ICPR countries. The co-
ordination group co-ordinates the work of the ICPR and prepares the decisions of the 
Plenary Assembly. It meets approximately four times per year. The ICPR is supported by 
its permanent secretariat, located in Koblenz (Germany). 
Formally not part of the ICPR is the Ministers Conference, which consists of the 
pertinent ministers of the ICPR countries. The Ministers Conference meets on an ad-hoc 
basis and functions as the highest authority. Unlike the Plenary Assembly, the Ministers 
Conference can take (politically) binding decisions. The Minister Conference also 
adopted the Rhine Action Plan. 
The public is in several ways involved in the work of the ICPR. Firstly, according to the 
new Rhine Treaty”, the IRC has to exchange information with relevant NGOs, take their 
position into account when taking decisions, and inform the organisations about the 
decisions. For years already the ICPR has published and actively disseminated reports 
containing for instance monitoring results. Secondly, nineteen NGOs have obtained 
observer status inn the Commission. They can participate in the discussions in the 
Plenary Assembly, the working groups and the project groups; the co-ordination group is 
closed for NGOs. Finally, each member state is totally free to organise national 
preparatory meetings with NGOs or other forms of PP on Rhine issues (Enserink, Kamps 
and Mostert 2003; Kampa, Kranz and Hansen 2003; Garritsen, Vonk and de Vries 2000). 
 
Danube 
The history of the Danube and even its international character is inextricably linked to 
regional and geo-political developments. At the eve of the First World War, the major 
basin country was the Austro-Hungarian empire, but after the First World War it was 
split up and new countries were formed. In the aftermath of the Second World War, most 
of these countries became part of the Soviet Block and only Germany and Austria were 
part of the Western block. Following the fall of communism in 1989, Czechoslovakia, 
   Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were split up, resulting in a total of eighteen basin 
countries, which makes the Danube basin the most international basin in the world 
(table). The most recent political change is the accession of several basin countries to the 
European Union. 
 











Albania  126  Part of Ottoman empire (until 1912)  -  - 
Austria  80,423  Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918)  1995  1994 
Bosnia i 
Herzegovina 
36,636  Ottoman Empire (until 1878) 
Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918) 
Yugoslavia (until 1992) 
- 2004 
Bulgaria  47,413  Ottoman Empire (until 1878)  2007  1994 
Croatia  34,865  Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918) 




21,688  Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918) 
Czechoslovakia (until 1992) 
2004 1994 
Germany 56,184  Different German States (until 1871)  1951/56  1994 
Hungary  93,030  Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918)  2004  1994 
Italy  565  Danube part formerly Austrian  1951/56  - 
Macedonia 109  Ottoman  Empire (until 1913/19) 
Yugoslavia (until 1991)) 
- - 
Moldova  12,834  Russia/ Soviet Union (1812-1918, 1940-
1941, 1947-1991) 
Romania (1918-1940, 1941-1947) 
- 1994 
Poland  430  Danube part Austrian until 1918  2004  - 
Romania  232,193  Partly Ottoman Empire (until 1859) 





88,635  Ottoman Empire (until 1829/ 1878) 




47,084  Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918) 
Czecoslovakia (until 1992) 
2004 1994 
Slovenia  16,422  Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918)  2004  1994 
Switzerland 1,809  -  -  - 
Ukraine  30,520  Russia/ Soviet Union (until 1991)  -  1994 (ratified 
2002) 
Table: Danube basin countries (ICPDR 2005; Brogan 1990, www.historyofnations.net) 
 
As with the Rhine, international co-operation started in the field of navigation. In 1856, 
the Paris Treaty, which concluded the Crimean War, established the European Danube 
Commission. This treaty was complemented as a result of the Trianon Peace Treaty from 
1919, which established the Permanent Technical Hydraulic System Commission of the 
Water regime. Detailed regulations had to be agreed upon bilaterally between the 
different new states. This system ensured for instance a faultless functioning of the water 
level and flood warning service, but it also had deficiencies in many respects and mainly 
served to maintain existing conditions (Bruhàcs 1993). 
The 1947 peace treaties only contained provisions concerning the navigational uses of the 
Danube. The two former Danube Commissions were combined into one Danube 
   Commission, but apart from that the system of bilateral agreements was further 
developed. Multilateral treaty that were signed were the Belgrade Convention (1948, 
navigation), the Convention concerning fishing in the waters of the Danube (1958, only 
Soviet block countries) and the five-party convention on the protection of the river Tisza, 
a major tributary of the Danube, and its own tributaries, against pollution (1986) 
(Bruhàcs 1993). 
With the collapse of communism in the late eighties new opportunities developed. In 
February 1991 the basin states agreed to develop a Convention on the Protection and 
Management of the River. Moreover, with the financial support of donors such as the 
European Union, UNEP, the World Bank and USAID, an environmental programme for 
the Danube basin was prepared and implemented through a Programme Coordination 
Unit (ICPDR 2004; Murphy 1997). In 1994 the Danube Convention was signed 
(Convention 1994) and the (at first Interim) International Commission for the Protection 
of the Danube River (ICPDR) was established. The ICPDR gradually took over the work 
of the PCU. Due to the war in the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Bosnia Herzegovina acceded to the treaty only in 2002 and 2004 respectively. 
The tasks and structure of the ICPDR are similar to those of the ICPR. The ICPDR 
consists of a conference of the parties (comparable to the Ministerial Conferences in the 
Rhine basin), a plenary commission, nine expert and working groups and a permanent 
secretariat, located in Vienna. The Commission has eleven observers, including several 
professional organizations, the Danube Environment Forum, the World Wildlife Fund 
and the International Association of Water Supply Companies in the Danube River 
Catchment Area. 
 
The European Water Framework Directive 
Currently the most important factor in the management of the both the Rhine and the 
Danube basin, at least in as far as water quality and ecology is concerned, is the European 
Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), which was published and thereby entered into 
force on 22 December 2000 the was officially published (Kallis and Butler 2001; 
Holzwarth 2002; Nilsson, Langaas and Hannerz 2004; Kaika and Page 2003; Page and 
Kaika 2003). The WFD establishes a framework for water management in Europe and 
complements the many previous water directives. The key objective of the directive is to 
achieve a "good status" for all European waters by 2015. Present and future EU water 
quality standards have to be met, groundwater resources should not be overexploited, and 
aquatic ecosystems and associated terrestrial ecosystems should deviate only slightly 
from their natural state. 
The backbone of the Water Framework Directive is a system of river basin management. 
Member states are obliged to identify their river basins and assign them to "river basin 
districts". For all districts, national and international, six-yearly river basin management 
plans and programmes of measures need to be developed. To ensure the necessary 
national co-ordination, member states need, among others, to identify a "competent 
authority". For international basins EU member states have to coordinate their activities 
and they have to “endeavour” to coordinate with non-EU members in the basin (art. 3.5). 
Finally, public participation plays a crucial role in the WFD. Three times in the planning 
process public commenting periods have to be organised, and in addition there is a 
   general requirement to “encourage active involvement” in the implementation of the 
WFD (Drafting Group 2002). 
In the Danube basin the implementation of the WFD is coordinated by the Danube 
Commission. Implementation in the Rhine basin is coordinated by Rhine Coordination 
Committee, which also includes basin states that are not a member of the International 
Rhine Commission. According to the requirements of the WFD, both for the Rhine and 
for the Danube, characterisation of the basin has been made, the impact of human 
activities has been assessed and an economic analysis of water use has been made 
(ICPDR 2005; Rhine basin states 2005). This will serve as a basis for setting 
environmental objectives in the river basin management plan and for developing 
programmes of measures to reach these objectives, both due for 2009. 
The WFD forces water managers in the different basin states to co-operate even more 
with other countries and with other policy sectors, such as agriculture (diffuse pollution) 
and spatial planning. This is the only way to reach the environmental objectives of the 
Directive. It is important to note in this respect that the European Union’s directive have 
a very special status. European directives are prepared by the European Commission and 
enacted by the European Parliament and the Council of (national) Ministers. If afterwards 
a member state of the EU does not implement a directive correctly, the European 
Commission can bring the member state before the European Court of Justice and very 
high fines can be imposed. 
4  The Iberian river basins 
Few Western European member States are heavily dependent on water from upstream 
countries. The Netherlands is one; Germany is both upstream and downstream, and in the 
Mediterranean area, Greece, and above all Portugal are. The difference between the 
Rhine and the rivers shared by Spain and Portugal is that in the first case it is a quality 
and flooding problem, while in the second it is a water scarcity and allocation problem. 
Even though for an economist the cost sharing issue would not be different, 
Mediterranean countries argue that the water allocation dispute is far more serious than 
the quality issue. 
Spain and Portugal have four principal rivers in common: the Miño/Minho, the 
Duero/Douro, the Tajo/Tejo, and the Guadiana. All four start from Spain and then enter 
Portugal, except for the Minho/Miño, which is a boundary between both countries. The 
estuary of the Guadiana river is a frontier as well. 
The dispute has its origin in the century old decision of the Spanish State to ‘regenerate’ 
the country through the construction of dams and aqueducts or canals devoted to store 
and transfer water, both to generate electricity and to irrigate. This will eventually reduce 
the volumes of water available for Portugal, which is dependent on Spanish born rivers 
for 40% of the total flows.  
The first Spanish projects focussed on the Ebro, which is flowing towards the 
Mediterranean and has only a few small tributaries in France, but no sharing with 
Portugal. The Ebro gets a lot of water, because it drains the southern slopes of the 
Pyrenees. Back in 1926, the authoritarian regime of Primo de Rivera created the 
Confederación Hidrográfica del Ebro (“Hydrographic Confederation of the Ebro”), 
   which developed irrigation colonies in Catalonia and in Aragon. Later, General Franco’s 
government generalised the river-basin approach, and covered the country with 
Confederaciones; after the Civil war, Spain built a large number of dams, so that Spain is 
now the third country in the world in number of reservoirs. 
Portugal also shared the same goal of development through intensification of agriculture. 
However, the north of the country is water rich through quite heavy rainfall, and south of 
Lisbon was a territory of very large and extensive land holdings, a quasi-desert. So, the 
situation was not too conflicting, since agreements had been found for hydroelectricity 
generation (after navigation at the end of 19th century). Indeed, an old Convention for the 
regulation and development of hydroelectricity on the international stretches of the Douro 
river and its tributaries, dating back 1927, was updated and extended in 1964. The 1964 
convention assigned parts of the frontier stretches to each country to build its own dams. 
In 1968 an equivalent Convention was adopted in 1968 for the rivers Minho, Lima, Tejo, 
Guadiana and Chança, and their tributaries, including the whole river basins in the 
bargain and not just the frontier sections. Rivers were seen by both countries as 
functional and productive, not as a territory with many other uses and biodiversity. (See 
also Gendrot 2003) 
Back in 1933, Spanish engineers had started thinking about diverting water from rivers 
flowing towards Portugal, so as to increase irrigated areas in the rich but dry plains of the 
South east (Valencia, Murcia, Almeria) and also inland. A first transfer was launched 
under General Franco in 1971 and inaugurated in 1979: the Tajo-Segura transfer. But the 
amount of water diverted remained moderate, for climatic reasons and also because of the 
price of that water. 
After the return to democracy, Spain developed a National Water Plan where water 
should be drawn from the Ebro delta, all the way to the south of Andalucia, the Ebro 
itself getting support from the Duero, and the latter eventually from the Tejo. This plan 
was published in 1993 by the socialist government, at a time when the European Union 
had obtained a direct competency on environmental issues. This meant that the 
implementation of the plan, which would require financial help from the Commission and 
from the Cohesion funds, would later be subjected to environmental and economic 
sustainability reviewing. But within Spain itself, the plan stirred such heated controversy 
between donor and receiver regions, that it had to be shelved before a vote in the national 
Parliament (Mezo 1995). 
The Portuguese, who were very worried that increasing amounts of water would be 
diverted towards the Mediterranean took advantage of the situation to negotiate a new 
convention. The Albufeira convention was signed on November 30, 1998, and its title 
indicates a much larger scope than previous conventions: “Convention about cooperation 
for the protection and the sustainable exploitation of water in Luso-Spanish river-basins.” 
In the convention, Spain agreed to postpone its projects to transfer water away from 
Portugal (Vlachos and Correia 2000). 
Portugal did not require their complete abandonment. Portugal water experts were in an 
awkward situation: they wanted Spain to leave water flows untouched, but eventually 
would develop similar multipurpose projects in Portugal. In particular, Portugal had 
finalised an old project to regenerate the Alentejo region thanks to the construction on the 
Guadiana river of the largest reservoir in Europe, supposed to be the Portuguese 
Tennessee Valley. This project needed a sufficient water flow from Spain, in return for 
   which Portugal gave more power generation rights to Spain on the shared rivers further 
north (Martinez 2004). And, even though the 1998 convention is much more tuned to the 
new international vision of integrated water management, in practice it leaves 
possibilities to pursue the former policies, and was immediately criticised as such by 
academics and environmental movements. 
In a second version of the Spanish National Water Plan, adopted in 1999, Spain reduced 
the transfers to the sole domestic part (from the Ebro delta to Barcelona and to Murcia - 
Almeria). This reduces the tension with Portugal, but now generates intense controversy 
inside Spain with Aragon, where more reservoirs should be built. On top of this, the 
decision of the European Union to stop the funding for lack of appropriate environmental 
and economic assessment has halted the project. It remains to be seen whether this will 
give time for a sort of regional aggiornamento (less central governments, more regional 
bargaining on more modest projects). 
In the whole process, until now, there has been little public participation. Several 
reservoirs of this two States project are subject to deep controversy at local level, while 
the projected water transfers gave rise to enormous protests and demonstrations in the 
major cities of Spain, in a way yet unseen in any member State. 
There has been significant change in favour of a “new water culture”, as witnessed by the 
development of Iberian congresses organised by very numerous academics from both 
countries (e.g. Arrojo Agudo and Martinez 1999). This movement was eventually 
enlarged to the whole European Union and resulted in the Madrid Declaration of 
Scientists for a New Water Culture (18 February 2005: Arrojo Agudo 2005). The last 
water framework law adopted by Portugal at the end of 2005 not only incorporates the 
European Water Framework Directive, but it also creates new river-basin institutions 
with taxation powers under the polluter-pays and abstractor-pays principles (Ministerio 
de Ambiente do Ordenamento do Território e do Desenvolvimento regional 2005). This 
might create a decentralisation movement allowing for more direct bargaining between 
riparian stakeholders at regional level within the shared river basins. 
5  Recommendations 
Europe has a long history of transboundary water resources management. Despite some 
problems, there has been and still is a lot of transboundary cooperation.. If we look more 
specifically at the experiences in the Rhine, the Danube and the Iberian river basins, there 
is one factor that stands out: the importance of the political and cultural context. 
The political and cultural context has been crucial for both the development and the 
substance of transboundary water resources management. Geo-political developments 
such as the First and the Second World War and the collapse of Communism, have at 
times redrawn national boundaries and necessitated, obstructed and facilitated 
transboundary co-operation. National factors, such as the absence or presence of 
decentralisation and public participation and the current “water culture” – large-scale 
centralised water resources development or decentralised water demand management – 
have determined the substance of the co-operation. And finally, the European Union 
plays a crucial role, both in a transboundary and in a national context. 
   The importance of the context limits the transferability of the experiences described in 
this paper to other parts of the world. Indeed, every river basin is unique. Yet, there are 
still some common factors. Section 2 of this paper already presented a general framework 
for understanding the development of transboundary river basin management and gave a 
typology of stakeholders. The European experiences described confirm and illustrate 
different aspects of this framework. 
Using the general framework and the European experiences, we can give four 
recommendations for promoting transboundary water resources management that 
contributes to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals: 
1.  The key activity for promoting transboundary water resources management is to 
promote the development and implementation of (formal or informal) transboundary 
agreements (see on the role of international donors in this: Mostert 2005). 
2.  The political and cultural context should be taken into account or could even be 
targeted directly. 
3.  All major stakeholders should be involved in order to maximise the chances of an 
agreement that actually contribute to the attainment of the Milennium Development 
Goals and minimise the chance of national opposition that obstructs its 
implementation. The major stakeholders are not “states”, but the different national 
government bodies, regional and local governments, international governments and 
donors, the media, civic society, individual water users and/ or influential individuals 
(cf. Trottier 2003a). 
4.  Regional organisations such as the EU can play an important supportive role (cf. on 
Africa: Wirkus and Böge 2005). 
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